From: David Gerard <dgerard(a)gmail.com>
Date: 2008/6/5
Subject: Re: [Wikitech-l] TorBlock extension enabled
To: Wikimedia developers <wikitech-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org>
2008/6/5 Tim Starling <tstarling(a)wikimedia.org>rg>:
Andrew Garrett wrote:
> The TorBlock extension will override local IP
blocks to provide a
> consistent treatment of tor.
I've disabled this behaviour for now, so that
we can have a more orderly
phase-in period with community discussion. Admin blocks of Tor exit nodes
will continue to work. The new protections which have been introduced will
also work, and so Tor anonymous users on the English Wikipedia will
typically see two block messages.
Thanks for holding off on this :-)
I've asked the other checkusers concerned about this to post useful
information to wikitech-l about what we actually see in practice on
en:wp (buckets of toxic waste through Tor, the fabulously illustrative
case of Runcorn concerning softblocks, etc), so as to supply the devs
with good info.
I don't have the records to do a statistically valid analysis of the
use of Tor by sockpuppets and vandals as compared to other types of
proxies. I'm sure that the new extension, which amounts to global
"firm" blocking of Tor exits (more than a soft block but less than a
hard block) will cut down on the use of Tor by casual or lazy vandals.
However, the firm block would not address the problem of determined
abusive users using proxies to conceal their activities. The two most
prominent cases that come to mind are Poetlister (whose sock Runcorn
downgraded blocks on Tor exits so that her other socks could use them)
and Mantanmoreland, who created a second account that exclusively used
proxies in order to avoid checkuser confirmation. Or see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_checkuser/Case/Fantevd,
where a nominally good user with 6000 edits was found to be running a
sock farm via open proxies, ultimately involving 24 accounts with 3000
edits to
Both of these accounts caused significant disruption and drama.
Blocking all proxies that exit to Wikipedia could potentially prevent
similar future situations, but not if all the puppetmaster has to do
is to keep a low profile for 90 days.
And at least on enwiki, the "moral" reason for softblocking Tor exits
(to allow people to edit from repressive locations, etc) has been
voided by the enabling of the IP block exemption.
Gmaxwell correctly pointed out in an email to checkuser-L that if Tor
exits are hardblocked, smart puppetmasters will use other proxies.
True, but we can block those proxies. We *can't* block Tor exits, at
least if the override behavior is in place. In fact, with the
override enabled, the new extension will actually *encourage*
sockpuppeteers to use Tor, because it will guarantee they will always
be able to edit as long as they have the patience to wait for their
socks to be autoconfirmed. They will no longer run the risk of
enrolling in a commercial anonymizing service only to discover that we
have blocked it.
I think this extension is a great idea and I thank all the volunteers
who worked on it, but I think the override is a very bad idea.
Thatcher